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BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is a foreclosure action upon both real and personal
property, the property consisting of an operating mink ranch located
near Lehi, Utah, and an assignment of a Real Estate Contract upon the
home of the defendant, Sylvia W. Woolsey.

The trial court properly

held that the three promissory notes totaling some $160,000.00 were
due and owing and ordered the appointment of a receiver in view of
evidence that the mink were being neglected and that approximately
$25,000.00 in mink skins had been stolen.

The trial court ordered the

sale of the security and since the Appellants did not post a Superdeseas
Bond, the property has been sold with a substantial deficiency resulting.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The trial court awarded judgment to the Respondent foreclosing
the security interests with the subsequent sale resulting pursuant to
Foreclosure Decree.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks to sustain the trial court's judgment as
entered.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Respondent, State Bank of Lehi, had financed a mink operation near Lehi, Utah, for several years during which time the loan had
In 1975 the bank, once again, refinanced the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Appellants with the understanding that additional financing would not
be forthcoming and that they must live within their outlined budget,
and required additional security consisting of the assignment of a
Real Estate Contract on Mrs. Woolsey's home in Provo, Utah.
In December of 1975, the Appellants had been advanced all of
the money pursuant to the three notes in question, had incurred an
overdraft of approximately $1,000.00, and at approximately the same
time advised the bank that some 981 mink pelts had been stolen from his
ranch.

In addition, bank authorities observed the mink operation being'
I

neglected and, after consulting with counsel, the board of directors
determined that the Appellants could not obtain outside financing, and
that immediate action was necessary to preserve their collateral.
On January 2, 1976, a receiver was appointed who continued to
operate the ranch until the sale of the security was conducted on the
13th day of October, 1976, resulting in a sizeable deficiency.
ARGUMENT ON APPEAL
The Respondent argued that the trial court acted within its
discretion in trying this matter without a jury in view of such foreclosure action being an equitable suit and, further, that the court
entertained all testimony regarding the documents in question but,
further, that no fraud was involved and, therefor, struck testimony
violating the parole evidence rule.

Such action upon the part of the

trial court was well within its discretion and did not constitute
error.

Respondent believes that the record shows overwhelming evidence

to support the Findings, Conclusions and Judgment of Foreclosure.

-2-
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POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN GRANTING RESPONDENT'S
MOTION TO STRIKE DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL.
This action was for the purpose of foreclosing upon three
(3) promissory notes secured by assignments of contract (Exhibits 12
and 13), and security agreement (Exhibit 15).

Originally the Appellants

had requested a jury trial and, subsequent thereto, the Respondent filed
a motion to strike which was granted by Judge Bullock after the filing
of legal memoranda and oral argmnent.

The Order striking the jury stated:

"This Order is based upon the finding by this Court that the
issues to be decided are largely equitable and arise from
an interpretation of written contracts and therefore the
defendants are not entifled to a jury trial."
In Norback v. Board of Directors of Church Extension Soc.,
84 Utah 506, 37 P. 2d 339 P. 345 (1934), this Court stated:
"If the issues are legal or the major issue legal, either
party is entiled upon proper demand to a jury trial; but if
the issues are equitable or the major issues to be resolved
by an application of equity, the legal issues being merely
subsidiary, the action should be regarded as equitable and
the rules of equity apply."
The basic question, therefore, is whether the major issues are
legal or equitable.

This court has offered some guidance in the res-

olution of this question in the case of Sweeney v. Happy Valley, Inc.,
18 Utah 2d 113, 417 P. 2d 126 P. 128-129 (1966), wherein the court
stated:
"In circtunstances where doubt exists as to whether the cause
should be regarded as one in equity, or one in law wherein
the party can insist on a jury as a matter of right, the
trial court should have some latitude of discretion. In
making that determination it is not bound by the ostensible
form of the action, nor by the particular wording of the
pleadings. It may examine into the nature of the rights
asserted and the remedies sought in the light of the facts
of the case to ascertain which predominates; and from that

-3-
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detennination make the appropriate order as to a jury 0
.
. 1
r
non- Jury tria . The fact that the division of court hea .
the pre-trial indicates that the case is set for a trialrmg
by jury is entitled to some consideration and should not
be countennanded without good reason. Nevertheless it is
the prerogative of the judge who actually tries the case
to make the detennination. Unless it is shown that the
ruling was patently in error or an abuse of discretion
this court will not interfere •with the ruling thereon.:,
The Appellants have attempted to show that the major issues
were legal rather than equitable since the trial court's Findings of
Fact numerically outnumbered the Conclusions of Law.

This is clearly

insufficient to show a patent abuse of discretion as required by the
Sweeny case, supra. It is true that once a jury trial is found to be
proper, issues of fact are for the jury.
of fact does

But the existence of issues

not warrant a conclusion that the Appellants therefore

had a right to a jury trial.
must be some legal issue.

Before a trial may be had to a jury there

In Petty v. Cl.ark, 102 Utah, 129 P

2d 568

(1942), a jury was allowed to decide the one legal issue of whether
a clause was contained in the instrument at the time it was delivered.
In Holland v. Wilson, 8 Utah 2d 11, 327 P. 2d 2SO (19S8), this court
reaffirmed its view in Norback, supra, that if there are subsidiary
legal issues in an equitable action the rules of equity would apply.
This would appear to restrict somewhat the allowance in Petty v · Clark,
supra, of the jury to try one legal issue when the major issues were
equitable.
According to SS

Am. Jur. 2d Mortgages §S88,

"Since a foreclosure suit is a suit- in eQuity, there is in
most jurisdictions no right to a jury trial, unless granted
by constitutional or statutory provision, even though a
. .
'ning after
personal judgment or decree for any d e f iciency remai
application of the proceeds is sought."
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Even in cases in which jury trial is allowed
to written instrwnents is to be determined by the court.

the legal effect
In the case of

Verdi v. Helper State Bank, 57 Utah 564, 196 P. 225 P. 228 (1921), this
court stated:
"It is manifest that the court erred in submitting proposition "a" to a jury. In doing that the court required
the jury to do what clearly the law requires of the court.
The legal effect of written instrwnents is necessarily a
question of law, and hence is one that must be determined
by the court. To that rule there is no exception, not
even in cases where the facts respecting the terms of the
written instrwnerits are in dispute, which arise sometimes
where the written instrwnents have been lost. In the latter
class of cases the jury may find what the terms of the
instrwnents were, but the court must, nevertheless,_determine
the legal effect of the instrwnents when the terms are
found and determined."
In addition, the question of whether the writing is completely
integrated is also for the court.

In 75 Am. Jur.2d Trial §410, it is

stated that:
"The question whether a writing is, upon its face, a
complete expression of the agreement of the parties is
one for the court, and subject to qualifications where
the contract is uncertain and ambiguous, particularly
where extrinsic evidence has been introduced of surrounding facts and circwnstances bearing upon intention
of the parties, the general rule is that where a contract
has been reduced to writing, its interpretation, construction, or legal effect is for the court and not for
the jury. This is true whether the written agreement
is expressed in one docwnent or in several, provided the
writings express the complete agreement of the parties
and the language used is clear, plain, certain, undisputed,
unambiguous, unequivocal, and not subject to conflicting
inferences, or where the only doubt as to its meaning
arises from the language the parties used, and not from
extrinsic matters. In other words, where a clear meaning
can be ascertained without resort to extrinsic facts, the
interpretation of a writing is for the court
This rule is
as applicable to c0mmercial correspondence as to a formal
written contract. Thus, the scope and effect of a contract
which depends wholly upon written correspondence, and not
upon extrinsic circwnstances, are to be determined by the
court. Whether terms of art were used in their ordinary
meaning or not, in a contract between men familiar with

onsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Servi
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the business to which the tenns relate, cannot
be left to the jury, although they may detennine the
meaning of the terms in that business. The court
cannot devolve its duty of c~nstruing written
instruments upon the jury merely because its
perfonnance involves possible difficulty."
The major issues in the case at bar were equitable and,
therefore those issues, as well as subsidiary legal issues, were
rightfully tried without a jury.

Since the major issues revolved

around the effect to be given the tenns of a written contract, there
would be little for a jury to decide, even if it were an action at law.
Since the foreclosure is a suit in equity there is no jury allowed no
matter how many issues of fact there are.

Since the Appellants have

failed to show that the trial court's Order granting Respondent's
motion to strike demand for jury trial was a patent error or abuse of
discretion, such Order should be upheld.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN HOLDING THAT THERE WAS NO
EXTENSION OF THE DUE DATE OF THE $115,000 NOTE.
It is generally held that an agreement to extend a due date
of a note must possess all of the traditional requirements of any con·
tract.

In the landmark case in this area, Tsesmelis v. Sinton State

Bank, 53 S.W. 2d 461 P. 462, 85 A.L.R

319 (Tex. 1932), the court state!:

"To support a ·contention that the payment of a
negotiable instrument has been extended, there must
exist all the elements essential to the execution of
a contract and the agreement for the extension must
be for a d~finite time and mutually bind the parties,
payor and payee, the one to forbear suit during the
time of extension, and the other his right to pay the
debt before the end of that time."
In order for the consideration to be sufficient, the creditor
-6-
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must secure, by reason of the extension, something which he could not
otherwise demand.

In the case at bar, since theoriginal note of

$115,000.00 was secured by all present and all future animals, no
additional benefit was given to the creditor by way of the July 3, 1975
Security Agreement.

Any collateral added by the July 3, 1975 Security

Agreement was to secure the loan of an additional $50,000.00 to the
Appellants.

A predominant authority on contracts offered the following

in regard to the sufficiency of consideration for an extension of a
due date of a promissory note:
"If, however, the debtor neither promises to refrain
from paying the debt until a fixed day in the future, nor
to pay interest until that time whether the debt is paid
or not, there is no consideration to support the creditor's
promise to extend the time of payment." 1 Williston on
Contracts §122.
In addition to the lack of consideration> ·the alleged extension
agreement in the case at bar lacked mutuality.

In the case of Keefer

v. Valentine,199 Iowa.1337, 203 N.W. 787 (1925), there was not an
extension of the due date since the debtor "still had a right to pay
the note at any time."

Also, in Tolbert v.· McSwain,137 S.W. 2d 1051

(Tex. Civ. App. 1939), the court said, "During' the period of the extension provided for the maker cannot have the right to make· payment."
Since there was no consideration for the alleged extension
agreement, and since there was no showing by the Appellants that he
had promised not to pay the note.during the period of the alleged
extension, there was, as a matter of law, no agreement for·the extension
of the due date on the $115,000.00 note;

The trial court was therefore

right in finding that the $115,000.00 note was in default at the time
this suit was instituted.
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POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN HOLDING ALL THREE NOTES
TO BE DUE AND OWING IN THAT THE APPELLANTS DID NOT ESTABLISH LACK
OF GOOD FAITH ON THE PART OF THE RESPONDENT IN DECLARING THE NOTES

DUE.
Paragraph 8 of the Security Agreement dated July 3, 1975,
states the grounds upon which the notes may be declared to be in
default.
Subparagraph (1) provides as a ground for declaration of
default that, "Debtor fails to pay any of the Obligations when due."
Since the $115,000.00 note was overdue as of February 20, 1975, and
since there was no extension of the due date, as amply shown in the
previous Point, it is clear that the $115,000.00 note was due and owing
on January 2, 1976, the date the other two notes were declared due and
owing.
Subparagraph (4) allows for a declaration of default when
the, "Debtor becomes insolvent or unable to pay debts as they mature."
It was admitted on page 16 of the Appellant's brief that the Appellants
were insolvent on January 2, 1976.

In addition, Calvin H. Swenson

testified, on page 79 of his deposition, that there had been an over·
draft of over $1,000.00 on an overdue feed bill.

On page 80 of his

deposition, Mr. Swenson also testified that the bank had to pay feed
and supply bills totalling approximately $10,000.00 in order to keep
the mink from becoming worthless and unmarketable.
The third ground upon which the Respondent relied in declarin!
the notes to be in default was under Subparagraph (10) which states that
the debtor shall be in default if "any collateral is lost, stolen or
materially damaged.

Appellants admitted that some 968 mink pelts were
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late December of 1975, shortly before the bank declared the
notes due on January 2, 1976.

Subparagraph (10).was not conditional

upon a lack of insurance, but stated that any theft or loss would
cause the notes to be in default.

The Appellants should not now be

heard to object to this ground for default since he voluntarily signed
the Security Agreement.
The fourth ground for default is Subparagraph (11) which states
that the debtor shall be in default if_ the "Bank shall deem itself insecure for any reason whatsoever.'.'

This Subparagraph is suJ?ject to

Section 70A-l-208, Utah Code_ Annotated, which provides:
"A term providing that one,_party or hi.s successor in "
interest may accelerate payment or performance or
require collateral or additional collateral 'at will'.or
'when he deems himself insecure' or in words of similar
import shall be construed to mean that he shall have
power to do so only. if he in g~od falth believes· that the
prospect of payment or perform~nce. is impaired. 1'ae
burden of establishing lack of good faith is on the party
against whom the power has been exercised."
This Court recently construed this statute in the case o.f
Williamson v. Wanlass, 545 P. 2d 1145 (Utah 1976), cited by Appellants,
but this case is readily distinguishable.

Respondent was clearly justi-

fied in believing that the prospect of payment was impaired.

Following

is a list of various admitted actions of.the Appellants.which show the
Respondent acted in good faith:
1 .. The threat of suicide on the part of Appellant, Ralph 0.
Woolsey.

(See Testimony of Ralph 0. Woolsey, R. 358, lines 1-6; and

Testimony of Calvin H. Swenson, R. 300, lines 3-4 and R. 308, lines 1-7);
2.

Judgments outstanding against Appellants (See Testi-

mony of Calvin H. Swenson, R. 319, lines 10-22);
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3.

The neglect of the animals (See Testimony of Calvin H.

Swenson, R. 301, lines 1-2, and Testimony of Berl Peterson, R. 486,
lines 2-8);
4.

The divorces of Appellant, Ralph O. Woolsey, and other

marital problems.

(See Testimony of Ralph O. Woolsey, R. 3S8,

lines 1-2 and R. 407, lines 23-26); and
S.

Appellant Ralph O •. Woolsey' s conviction for drunk driving

during the month preceding the institution of this suit.

(See Testimony

of Ralph 0. Woolsey, R. 407, line 27 through R. 409, line 2).
The foregoing conditions were clearly sufficient to justify
the Respondent,' thr~mgh its, president Calvin H. ··Swenson, in having

a good faith belief that the prospect of payment was impaired.

The

Appellants in.an attempt to fulfill their burden of showing a lack of
good faith, have pointed to. a number of Respondent• s actions which they
consider inequitable.
no demand for payment.

The first of these is that the Respondent made
It is stated in SS Am. Jur 2d, Mortgages §555:

"The general rule, in the absence of a statute or
mortgage stipulation .so providing, is that it .is not
essential that a demand for 'payment be made before
commencement of an action for foreclosure of a mortgage.
Clearly, where a mortgagor is insolvent, and has no
funds at the place of payment, demand there, prior to
foreclosure, is unnecessary."
That treatise cites Shaw v. Bill, 95 U.S. 10, 24 L. Ed. 333
(1877); Metropolitan State Bank v. Wright, 72 Colo. 106, 209 P. 804 (19W
and 147

A.L.R. 1109 as support for the preceding statements.

In the caf.

of Williamson v. Wanlass, supra, the attorney for the plaintiffs had
stated that the plaintiffs might accelerate if they became aggravated.
This Court then stated:
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"The question arises as to how the defendants would know
that condition came about unless someone so advised them.
It is generally true that if there is a condition to be
fulfilled, of which one party would be aware and the
other would not, it is regarded as fair and proper that
the one who knows should be obliged to notify the other
party affected thereby, and give him a reasonable'
opportunity to react thereto. "
This stands for the proposition that notice should be given
of conditions such as aggravation prior to the acceleration of the notes.
It does not stand for the proposition that a party be obligated to tell
the other party that it is in default when the party already knows that
it is in default.

It is clear that the Respondent acted properly in
' ..
accelerating without making a demand for payment upon the Appellant.

In light of the Respondent's knowledge of Appellant's insolvency and
inability to obtain outside financing, such demand would be useless.
At any rate, the Respondent's failure to make demand of the Appellant
is not a showing that the Respondent lacked a good faith belief that
the prospect of payment had been impaired.

Indeed, Appellant makes no

effort to show that the prospect of payment was even .existent, other
than Appellant's friendship with someone who might· have loaned Appellant
some money in the future.

It remains that at the time -the suit;.was

instituted the prospect of payment was at best dismal.
case, supra, this Court found a lack of good
prospect of payment was impaired.

In the Williamson

faith~elief

that the

The Court there stated:

"There was no such showing made in this case. From
the fact that the plaintiffs had a second mortgage
on this extensive property, there can be little.
doubt that the note would be paid, principal and
interest."
The case at bar can be distinguished on the facts from the
Williamson case.

In Williamson, the defendants had been consistently

late with payments, but payments were always made and accepted.

Here
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the debt had consistently grown larger with only occasional payments on the principal.

In Williamson, the plaintiffs had no good

reason to suspect that payments were not forthcoming.

In the case at

bar, the prospect of payment was in serious doubt.
The Appellant has also stated that it was a lack of good
faith for Respondent to accelerate the debt without giving notice of
the acceleration to the Appellant.

i

However, many cases have held tMt

notice of acceleration is not required in the absence of a specific

I
provision therefor in the mortgage.

See S. D. Walker, Inc. v. Brigal!llii

Beach Hotel Corp., 44 N.J. Suuer. 193, 129 A. 2d 758 (1957); ~.I
Foulger, 71 Utah 274, 264 P. 975

I

(1928); Jacobson v. McClanahan,

I

43 Wash. 2d 751, 264 P. 2d 253 (1953); and Julien v. Model Bldg. Loan
& Invest. Asso., 116 Wis. 79. 92 N.W. 561 (1902).

to 55

In addition,

accord~

Am. Jur. 2d, Mortgages §387,
"It is generally held that the institution of a suit
to foreclose a mortgage is notice of the most unequivocal character that the mortgagee wishes to
avail himself of his option for acceleration."
The following cases are cited as authority for this view:

Clark v. Paddock, 24 Idaho 142, 132 P. 795 (1913) ;· Swearingen v. Lahner,I
93 Iowa 147, 61 N.W. 431 (1894); S. D. Walker, Inc. v. Brigantine Beacll
Hotel Corp., suura; Hawes v. Detroit 'F & M Ins. Co., 109 Mich. 324.
67 N.W. 329 (1896)-;

National Life Ins. Co. v. Butler,61 Neb. 449, 85li

437 (1901); and Damet v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 72 Okla. 122, 179 P.

7601

Since- the -notes wer..e -in -Oefaul.t: .under- four different Subpar11,
of Paragraph 8 of the Security Agreement, and since the Appellants ha~
not fulfilled their burden of showing any lack of good faith in declar·i
ing the notes due, the decision of the trial court concerning these
issues should be upheld.
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POINT IV
THAT CONTRARY TO THE ASSERTIONS OF THE APPELLANTS THE COURT
DID NOT STRIKE TESTIMONY FROM THE RECORD CONCERNING THE SECURITY
AGREEMENT ASSIGNING MRS. WOOLSY'S INTEREST IN PROPERTY IN PROVO.
That contrary to the assertions of the Appellants the
Respondent can find nothing in the record indicating that the court
did not consider all evidence surrounding the assignment of Mrs.
Woolsey's interest in her residence in Provo, Utah.
On P 209 R. 461 is the only reference to excluding such
testimony.

This shows as follows:
MR. IVINS:

"Your Honor, for the record, I would like to

interpose an objection to this testimony on the grounds that Mrs.
Woolsey is attempting to alter the terms of this written document by
parol evidence."
THE COURT:
ment.

"Okay, I'm going to take that motion under advise-

I'll let you proceed, and it will be considered in the nature of

a proffer of proof, that at some time I'll rule whether or not that is
the case.

Go ahead."
Following this exchange with the court all testimony relating

to the obtaining of Mrs. Wool~ey's security was introduced and the court
did not, at any time, indicate that any testimony had been stricken and
the court found that there was no evidence to justify a finding of fraud
in obtaining such collateral.
This court has held on many occasions that the findings of the
lower court on factual matters will not be overruled unless there is a
clear abuse of discretion.

In the instant case the Respondent knows

of no testimony which was excluded and not considered in the findings
of the lower court.
-13-
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CONCLUSION
The Appellants have failed to prove that the trial judge
abused his discretion in striking Appellant's Demand for Jury
Trial.

The major issues of the trial were equitable;

legal issues,

if any, were clearly subsidiary to the predominant equitable issues,
The trial judge was correct in striking the Appellant's Demand for
Jury Trial since no jury is required to try equitable issues.
The Appellants failed to prove the existence of any oral
agreement to extend the due date on the $115,000.00 note and the
Respondent properly accelerated the maturity date on the $45,000.00
and the $5,000.00 notes since the Appellants were in default under
the provisions of four separate Subparagraphs of Paragraph 8 of the
Security Agreement dated July 3, 1975.
default are detailed on pages 9-10.

The actions constituting

The Appellants failed to show,

as was their burden, lack of good faith on the part of Respondent that
their prospects of payment had been impaired.

In fact, the weight of

the evidence clearly shows that the Respondent acted in good faith ana
the subsequent sale of collateral with a resulting substantial
deficiency conclusively shows the need for taking immediate action to
minimize their losses.
The Respondent respectfully urges the Appellate Court to
affirm the trial court's Judgment in this case.
Respectfully submitted,

I~

Heber Grant Ivins
Attorney for Plaintiff and
Respondent

-14-
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Mailed two copies of the foregoing Brief to S. Rex Lewis
for Howard, Lewis & Petersen, Attorneys for Defendants and Appellants,
120 East 300 North, Provo, Utah

84601, the 13th day of January, 1976.

Secretary
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